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Abstract
This paper studies a central feature that characterized the changes in wage inequality in Latin
America in the 1990s: log wages became a convex function of the level of education. The wage gap
between Higher and Intermediate Education increased and the one between Intermediate and Basic
Education declined. The double change in the wage di⁄erentials was driven by a signi￿cant drop
in the mean wage at Intermediate. I develop and simulate a dynamic general equilibrium model
of savings and educational choices under credit constraints and uninsurable earnings￿risk in which
ability is an important component of individual wages. I estimate the parameters of the model using
micro data from Mexico. The results show that the convexi￿cation was the result of changes in the
prices of education due to changes in its supply. Absent the general equilibrium price e⁄ects, the
changes in ability composition by education needed to produce the convexi￿cation would have been
unrealistically high.
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11 Introduction
In the decade of the 1990s Latin American Countries (LACs) have been characterized by a
process of educational expansion and signi￿cant changes in the wage di⁄erentials between edu-
cation levels. Compulsory education became almost universal and the share of individuals that
completed secondary and high school increased from around 32 to 48 per cent.1 Graduation
rates increased also at higher education: the proportion of college graduates went from an av-
erage of 13 per cent in 1987 to an average of 18 per cent in 2002.2 At the same time, the wage
di⁄erential between higher and intermediate education increased and the one between interme-
diate and basic education declined. Between 1987 and 2002 relative wages rose on average by
45 per cent at higher education and decreased by 26 per cent at intermediate education.
The result of the double change in the relative wages at higher and at intermediate education
is shown in Figure 1 in section 2. From a linear relationship between mean wages and the level of
education at the end of the 1980s, the wage pro￿le became convex with proportional increases in
education translating into higher than proportional increases in income for the more educated.
The changes in relative wages were driven by a decline in the mean wage at intermediate that fell
below the value at the end of the 1980s. Between 1987 and 2002 the mean wage at intermediate
decreased in real terms by three and two per cent in Brazil and Colombia and by as much as
￿ve per cent in Mexico.
The convexi￿cation of the wage pro￿le has received almost no attention. The empirical
literature on LACs has focused primarily on the increase in the premium to higher education.
To my knowledge, Bouillon, Legovini and Lustig (2005) is the only exception. They focus on
Mexico and estimate Mincer-type wage equations for the year 1984 and 1994 with the number
of years of education entering as a second order polynomial. They ￿nd that the quadratic term
is highly signi￿cant in 1994 in almost all regressions while barely signi￿cant or non-signi￿cant
in 1984. Their analysis is descriptive in nature while the aim in this paper is to investigate the
determinants of the convexi￿cation.
The mean wages in Figure 1 are a combination of three main components: the return to
observable (such as cohort, sector of employment and work experience) and to unobservable
1In the year 1987 the proportion of the adult population with completed secondary education was 32 per cent in Brazil,
34 per cent in Colombia and 30 per cent in Mexico. In the year 2002 these proportions increased, respectively, to 55, 43, 45
per cent in each of the three countries.
2In the year 1987 the proportion of college graduates among the adult population was around 12 per cent in Brazil, 17
per cent in Colombia and 10 per cent in Mexico. In the year 2002 these proportions increased to, respectively, 14, 21 and
17 per cent.
2(unobserved ability or quality of the workers) characteristics of those completing each level of
education, and the price of education, which is the market value of completing a given education
level independently of any (observable and unobservable) individual characteristic. Therefore,
the change of the wage pro￿le from linear to convex could be produced for three main reasons: a
change in the composition on observables and their returns, a change in the ability composition
by level of education of the cohorts of graduates in 1987 and in 2002 or a change in the prices
of education.
In the ￿rst case, the convexi￿cation would be the result of changes in the composition by
and the returns to observable characteristics that are relevant for wage determination, such as
cohort, gender, sector of employment and work experience, by level of education. This ￿rst
explanation is easy to check by estimating wage equations that control for observables and their
interaction with the level of education. The results are qualitatively very similar to the ones
reported in Figure 1. Controlling for age and its interaction with the level of education is
particularly important: the convexi￿cation is not the result of changes in the age structure of
the population or in the returns to a speci￿c age group.
In the second case, the change in the shape of the wage function would be produced by
changes in the ability composition of workers with intermediate and higher education. The
educational expansion at intermediate could have resulted into a decline in the mean ability
level and therefore a decrease in the observed wage at this level. At the same time, if the
expansion at intermediate enabled more high-ability people than before to progress to higher
education, mean ability and thus observed wages would have increased for college graduates.
In the third case, the production technology and the interactions between the demand and the
supply of skill would be of crucial importance: any change in the demand for skills would a⁄ect
the incentives to invest in human capital and return a value for the skill prices that re￿ ect the
degree of complementarity and substitutability between the di⁄erent production inputs. There
are no empirical studies of wage inequality in LACs that allow for endogenous education prices,
so nothing is known on the importance of the general equilibrium e⁄ects of changes in the prices
due to changes in the supply of skills.
Di⁄erently from the ￿rst one, the second and third explanations can not be investigated by
a simple look at the data. Instead, we need to develop a structural framework with two key
characteristics: being of general equilibrium with the inclusion of the demand and the supply of
skills and able to account for self-selection on ability into education. This paper provides such
3a framework.
I develop an incomplete market, dynamic, general equilibrium model of savings and ed-
ucational choices where the interest rate is taken as given and the education prices are the
equilibrium outcomes of changes in the supply and in the demand for skills. The model has
two important features. First, educational (and savings) choices are taken by altruistic parents
that face constraints on resources. The economy is made of overlapping generations of parents
and children with three distinct market failures: parents cannot buy insurance against their
own earnings￿risk, cannot borrow against future earnings of their children and face credit con-
straints. In each period parental resources are given by a stochastic labor income and the stocks
of a risk-free asset. Credit constraints are modelled as a limit to the amount that individuals can
borrow ranging from zero to the maximum amount that an individual can repay with certainty
over the life cycle, which is a function of the level of education, an insurable i.i.d. shock and an
endowment of ability that is received at birth and is perfectly transmitted across generations.
By having ability as an important component of wages, the model endogenously generates a
process of self-selection of higher ability individuals into higher education.
Second, the production function allows for complementarities between intermediate and
higher education. I assume that three education levels - basic, intermediate and higher educa-
tion - build up the economy human capital endowment and I allow the elasticity of substitution
(ES) between intermediate and basic education to di⁄er from the one between intermediate and
higher education. I estimate the production function using micro data from Mexico between
1987 and 2002. I ￿nd that the substitution elasticities are consistent with the complementarity
between intermediate and higher education. A key implication is that the growth of the supply
of intermediate education increases the relative demand for higher education and therefore its
marginal product while it decreases the relative return of intermediate with respect to basic
education.
Starting from an initial distribution of ability, wealth and education in 1987 estimated with
micro-data from Mexico, I solve for the steady state of the model under di⁄erent scenarios
characterized by a skill-biased technological change (SBTC - hereafter) and di⁄erent levels of
credit constraints and uninsurable earnings￿risk. Following Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998)
(HLT - hereafter), I estimate the value of the share of skilled labour in production in 1987 and
its average annual increase in the 1990s and I model a SBTC as a permanent increase in this
share.
4The results show that the convexi￿cation came about through changes in the prices of school-
ing due to changes in its supply. If the supply by education had been constant at the level
observed at the end of the 1980s, a SBTC would have produced an increase in both the relative
return to higher and to intermediate education. The simulations identify two main determinants
of the convexi￿cation. First, the complementarities in the production function are responsible
for the double change in the wage di⁄erentials. In addition to the standard supply e⁄ect, an
increase in the supply of intermediate further decreases the relative return to intermediate with
respect to basic education and increases the relative return to higher with respect to basic edu-
cation. Second, the level of the credit constraints determines the extent of the supply increase
at intermediate education and therefore the change in the wage at this level. Finally, an in-
crease in the level of uninsurable earnings￿risk produces an equilibrium prices￿schedule that
is "not enough" convex to match what is observed in the data: a high level of risk would have
prevented the sizable supply increase at intermediate and the drop of the price at this level that
characterizes the convexi￿cation.
1.1 Literature review
Several contributions are related to the analysis developed in this paper. They can be classi￿ed
in two main categories: the empirical literature on education and wages in Latin America and
the literature that uses dynamic general equilibrium (GE) models to study the changes in wage
inequality and their determinants.
With respect to the literature on wages and education in LACs, both the object of interest
and the approach taken in this paper are rather novel. Up to now all the contributions have been
focusing on the increase in the premium to higher education rather than on the convexi￿cation
and have adopted a partial equilibrium approach explaining the rise in the premium with changes
in the supply or in the demand of skills.
The "supply-side" literature focuses on ￿nancial constraints on educational choices and self-
selection on ability into higher education as two alternative determinants of the increase in the
relative wage of higher versus intermediate education. If ability is an important component of
wages, the premium to higher education might simply re￿ ect a composition e⁄ect of higher ability
into higher education. Alternatively, a decrease in the tightness of the ￿nancial constraints at
the intermediate level with the constraints remaining binding at higher education could also
have produced the increase in the skill premium by allowing the supply to increase more at
5intermediate than at higher education.
The main contribution for Mexico is Jacoby and Skou￿as (2002). They consider a sample of
young aged 19 to 21 between 1995 and 1999 and estimate the probability of attending college
conditional on high school completion controlling for unobserved ability, labor market conditions,
family background, and proxies for current and permanent parental income. They ￿nd current
parental income being an important determinant of college attendance and weak evidence of
selection bias.
A related contribution is Binelli, Meghir and Menezes-Filho (2008) (BMM - hereafter) for
Brazil. They distinguish between four levels of education and estimate the changes in the ability
distribution by level of education and birth cohort during the educational expansion in Brazil
in the 1990s. They ￿nd evidence of sizable changes in the mean ability level at intermediate
and higher education. However, the changes in ability composition can not fully account for the
steep increase in the College premium that remains largerly unexplained.
The "demand-side" literature focuses on the impact of trade liberalization and a series of
labor market reforms promoted in Latin America in the 1990s that increased the demand for
skilled labor in production. This second branch of literature is vast and counts on many di⁄erent
contributions for each Latin American country.3 Most empirical studies have found evidence of
a technological change that increased the demand for skilled labour, while a smaller set of
studies have estimated a positive impact of trade opening on the skill premium.4 However,
when the relative importance of the trade liberalization and the technology explanation has
been compared, a SBTC appears as the driving force behind the increase in the skill premium.5
Behrman, Birdsall and Szekely (2007) have performed an overall evaluation of the major
market reforms that characterized LACs in the 1980s and 1990s. They construct six indexes for
six main policy reforms and use a panel data set on eighteen LACs for the period between 1980
and 1998 to estimate the impact of the reforms on the relative wages to higher versus primary
and intermediate education.6 They ￿nd that trade liberalization did not have any signi￿cant
3Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) and Winters, McCullach and McKay (2004) provide two complete surveys of the literature.
4On the impact of a skill-biased change in production, see, among the others, Attanasio, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2002)
for Colombia and Corseuil and Muendler (2003), Pavcnik, Blom and Goldberg (2002) and Holm-Nielsen and Verner (2001)
for Brazil, Bustos (2005) for Argentina and Verhoogen (2008) for Mexico. On the impact of opening to trade, see, among
the others, Hanson and Harrison (1999) for Mexico and Lisboa, Menezes-Filho and Schor (2004), Gonzaga, Menezes-Filho
and Terra (2006) and Giovannetti and Menezes-Filho (2006) for Brazil.
5In practice trade opening and skilled-biased technological change are very related since a change in production towards
skilled labour could be the e⁄ect of increased exposure to international markets.
6The six reforms they consider are: privatization of former state enterprises, trade liberalization, capital account liber-
alization, domestic ￿nancial market liberalization, tax reforms and labor market reforms.
6impact on the changes in the wage di⁄erentials while the return to higher education signi￿cantly
increased when the economies became more technologically advanced and the exports of high-
technology products increased. Avalos and Savvides (2003) also ￿nd evidence suggesting a
positive association between increasing skill premium and technological change. Using a cross-
section of Latin American countries they show that exposure to foreign direct investment, greater
imports of machinery and equipment and R&D transfer from developed economies are associated
with increasing wage di⁄erentials between high and low-educated.
The analysis developed in this paper is also related to the literature that uses dynamic
GE models to study wage inequality. Up to now all papers have been focusing on the US
economy and, most importantly, have been trying to explain changes in relative returns. No
paper has analyzed the relevance of using a dynamic GE model to explain the convexi￿cation,
which amounts at explaining changes in relative returns and in the level of wages. The closest
contributions are HLT and Lee and Wolpin (2006) (LW - hereafter).
HLT is the ￿rst paper to have quanti￿ed the importance of the GE e⁄ects to explain changes
in wage inequality. They develop and simulate a GE model of training on the job, investment
in education and savings that they use to explain the increase in the skill premium observed in
the US between the 1970s and the 1990s. They model SBTC as a permanent technological shift
towards skilled labor and ￿nd that the increase in wage inequality can be explained as a result
of skill-speci￿c supply responses to a SBTC.
As in HLT, I jointly model savings and educational choices and I characterize SBTC as a
permanent shift towards skilled labour in production. However, my model di⁄ers in at least three
important aspects. First and most importantly, I do allow for credit constraints that are assumed
away in HLT framework. Second, I develop an OLG model of parents and children where parents
can use ￿nancial bequests and education as two alternative strategies to increase child lifetime
utility. This creates important interactions between education and saving investments, while
HLT do solve for an individual problem and savings are exogenously redistributed to the new
born at the end of life with no direct links between saving choices of successive generations.
Finally, I do not model on-the-job investment.
LW develop a structural dynamic GE model of work, schooling and sector-speci￿c occupa-
tional choice to explain the main facts that characterized the U.S. labor market in the 1970s,
1980s and 1990s. One important fact is the rise in the college wage premium. They ￿nd that a
SBTC was the main determinant of the increase in the premium. The model I develop is also
7an attempt to evaluate alternative explanations of the increase in wage inequality. However,
it di⁄ers from LW in at least one important dimension: I do model saving choices, while LW
assume that individuals can not save. Abstracting from savings allows LW to develop a model
with a very rich production structure, which they fully structurally estimate. However, it comes
at the cost of not being able to assess the impact of credit constraints and risk aversion on
occupation (education) choices, which in my model will be crucial to understand the evolution
of wage inequality.
A recent contribution that develops a GE model of savings and educational choices with
credit constraints and earnings￿risk is Gallipoli, Meghir and Violante (2007) (GMV - hereafter).
The model of GMV has a much richer structure than the one developed here, the main di⁄erence
being that it includes endogenous labor supply. Also, GMV use their model to address a very
di⁄erent question. They study the relationship between schooling decisions, wage inequality
and education policy. They are mainly interested in studying the long run e⁄ects of policy
interventions on educational choices and the distribution of earnings. The changes in wage
inequality associated with a particular policy is not a direct object of interest but rather an
outcome measure to assess the performance of an education policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some empirical evidence
on changes in wage inequality in Latin America in the 1990s. Section 3 presents the theoretical
model. Section 4 de￿nes the equilibrium. Section 5 discusses the parametrization of the model.
Section 6 presents the main results from the simulations. Section 7 gives some concluding
remarks. Appendix A describes the data, the construction of the education groups and the
estimation of the wage equations. Appendix B gives details of the solution methods.
2 Wage inequality and returns￿convexi￿cation
Table 1 reports the di⁄erence between the mean log hourly real wage at higher and interme-
diate and at intermediate and basic education for three main LACs. The values have been
computed from the National Household Survey of each of the three countries considering the
adult population aged between 25 and 60. The data for Colombia refer to 1988 and 1998.
The wage premium to higher education is substantial: in 2002 it is above one hundred per
cent in Brazil and Colombia and at around sixty-￿ve per cent in Mexico.7 In addition, the
7The value of the premium to higher education is much bigger than the corresponding ￿gure for developed countries.
For example, Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) ￿nd a value for the college premium in the US of around 15-20 per
cent.
8Relative wages
Year 1987 2002 Growth
Brazil
Higher vs. intermediate 0:828 1:100 33%
Intermediate vs. basic 0:927 0:557 ￿ 40%
Colombia
Higher vs. intermediate 0:832 1:092 31%
Intermediate vs. basic 0:551 0:429 ￿ 22%
Mexico
Higher vs. intermediate 0:375 0:646 72%
Intermediate vs. basic 0:451 0:384 ￿15%
Table 1: Di⁄erence in Log Hourly Real Wages by Level of Education (Source: Author￿ s calculations based
on household Surveys)
premium is rising over time, with an increase of around thirty per cent in Brazil and Colombia
and of over seventy per cent in Mexico. At the same time intermediate graduates have lost
ground. From a value of around ninety-three per cent in Brazil and ￿fty-￿ve and forty-￿ve
per cent in Colombia and Mexico at the end of the 1980s, by the year 2002 relative wages of
intermediate with respect to basic education decreased by around forty per cent in Brazil and
twenty-two and ￿fteen per cent in Colombia and Mexico. As a result of the increase in the
relative wages at higher education and the decline at the intermediate level the wage pro￿le has
become convex.
The convexi￿cation appears as a characterizing feature of the changes in wage inequality in
Latin America in the 1990s. Brazil, Colombia and Mexico are highly representative of LACs
accounting for over seventy per cent of Latin America GDP in this decade. Moreover, in her
analysis of the returns to schooling in Argentina between 1992 and 2003 Lopez Boo (2008) does
also ￿nd increasing convexity in the earnings-education pro￿le due to increasing returns to higher
education and decreasing returns to intermediate education. The convexity of the wage pro￿le
with respect to the level of education changes the typical concave shape of the wage function
observed in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s.8
























































































Figure 1: Returns￿Convexi￿cation in Latin America
10Figure 1 presents the mean log hourly real wage in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico at the end
of the 1980s and in 2002.9 In each of the three countries the convexi￿cation is apparent: from a
linear relationship at the end of the 1980s, wages have become a convex function of the level of
education.
In principle, the wage pro￿le could have become convex if both the relative wages at higher
and at intermediate education had increased with the relative increase at higher education big-
ger in magnitude than the one at intermediate. On the contrary, the feature that characterizes
the convexi￿cation of the wage pro￿le in LACs is the decrease in the relative wages at inter-
mediate with respect to basic education. In Colombia and Mexico the reduction of the wage
at intermediate came together with an increase in the mean wage at higher education. On the
contrary, in Brazil the mean wage at higher education was lower at the end than at the begin-
ning of the 1990s. However, the relative wage at higher education increased also in this country
since the decrease in the wage at higher education was smaller in magnitude than the one at
intermediate.10
The decrease in the relative wages at intermediate was driven by a drop in the mean wage
at this level. There was also a decrease in the wage at basic education but of a much smaller
magnitude. The salaries of workers with low education at the bottom of the wage distribution
are typically the most a⁄ected by changes in labor market institutions such as the minimum
wage. It could be that the extent of the fall of wages at basic education was limited by the
presence of binding minimum wages. However, with the exception of Colombia, the empirical
evidence for Latin America suggests that in the 1990s minimum wages were not binding.11 The
evidence for Mexico shows that the drop in the mean wages at basic was of a much smaller
size than the one of the minimum wages: between 1987 and 2002 minimum wages declined in
real terms by around 47 per cent while wages at basic education decreased by less than four
percentage points.
In the rest of the paper I will focus on Mexico. This country o⁄ers an interesting setting to
study the convexi￿cation. During the 1990s it underwent a series of reforms that changed the
structure of production and made the economy more open to foreign investment. The reform
9For each of the three countries the di⁄erence of the mean real wages by education between the two years is highly
statistically signi￿cant. A test of the increase of the relative wage at higher education and the decline of the relative wage
at intermediate education also returns highly signi￿cant results.
10Interestingly, a convexi￿ed wage pro￿le has also been found to be the driving factor of the steep increase in wage
inequality that characterized the US economy in the 1990s (see Deschenes (2002) and Lemieux (2006, 2007)). However, in
the US there is no evidence of a decline in the mean real wage at intermediate, which dismisses the possibility of a worldwide
decline in the wage for this skill.
11See Maloney and Nunez (2003) and Bosch and Manacorda (2007).
11e⁄ort culminated in 1994 when Mexico became a member of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and entered the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) with the US and Canada. In the same year Mexico was hit by a severe ￿nancial crisis,
the "Peso crisis", which resulted into a massive devaluation of the national domestic currency.
The recovery from the crisis was rather quick and by the end of 1995 Mexico had reentered the
international capital markets.
As discussed in section 1.1, several contributions have found that NAFTA and the economic
reforms of the mid 1990s increased the demand for skilled labor in production. More recently,
Verhoogen (2008) found the Peso crisis more than the opening to trade being associated with
an increase in the use of skilled labour and in the production of skill-intensive goods. What
is important for the analysis developed here is that, disregarding which explanation has been
favoured, all the contributions agree that in the 1990s Mexico underwent a structural change
towards the use of skilled labor. I will refer to this change as a skill-biased technological change
and I will study its role to explain the convexi￿cation.
3 The model
At each time t the economy consists of overlapping generations of parents and children that live
together for four periods: a pre-school period and three periods necessary to complete the three
education levels - basic, intermediate and higher education. At t = 1 each cohort schooling and
wealth distribution are taken as exogenous initial conditions. From t = 2 these distributions
evolve endogenously as a result of parental maximizing behavior. A description of the Mexican
schooling system and the construction of the education groups is presented in the ￿rst section
of Appendix A.
3.1 Supply side: household decision problem
A continuum of individuals is born at each time t. Each individual lives for eight periods, four
as a child and four as a parent. As a child the individual lives with the parent that works full
time and maximizes utility which is a function of joint household consumption. In the ￿rst two
periods consumption is the only choice variable. In the ￿rst period the child is in pre-school,
in the second period is sent to compulsory basic education. In the third and fourth period the
child can be sent either to school or to work. If the child is sent to school, the parent has to pay
a ￿xed cost that is education-speci￿c. If sent to work, the child works full time and gives her
12earnings to the parent. At the end of the fourth period the parent retires and leaves a bequest of
￿nancial assets to the child. The child starts the adult life with the level of education completed
during childhood and an amount of assets given by parental bequest.
Labor supply is perfectly inelastic and the wages clear the labor markets. The wage of an
individual i with education level j and age a in period t is given by:
w
i
j;a;t = pj;t ￿ exp(e
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where j = 1;2;3 denotes the education level from basic up to higher education, pj;t is the
equilibrium price for education level j in period t and ei
j;a;t denotes labor e¢ ciency of individual
i, which is a function of ￿i, the individual￿ s ability endowment, gj(agei
t), an education-speci￿c
polynomial in age which re￿ ects the growth of wages with experience, and zi
j;a;t, an education-
speci￿c i.i.d. uninsurable shock that is assumed to be normally distributed with mean ￿zj;a;t
and variance ￿2
zj;a;t.
The individual￿ s ability endowment, ￿i, represents the permanent component of human cap-
ital. It is a measure of ability and all unobservable family background factors that have a
permanent impact on human capital formation. It is assumed to be perfectly transmitted be-
tween successive generations: each individual inherits at birth the ability endowment of her
parent and passes it over to her own child.
In order to solve the household maximization problem the adults (parents) need to form
expectations on current and future skill prices, pj;t, that determine wages. Let us de￿ne as pt(a)
the vector of current and future skill prices forecasted from age a onwards. By omitting for



















a + 1 if Ia = 1
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a if Ia = 0
￿
8 a = a ￿ 1;a (5)
13Aa ￿ ￿Ba 8 a = a;:::;a ￿ 1 (6)
Aa ￿ 0 a = a (7)
where Xa denotes the vector of state variables at age a, which includes the level of adult edu-
cation, jP, that is ￿xed throughout adulthood, the level of child education, jC
a , the amount
of assets at age a, Aa, the vector of current and future skill prices forecasted from age a
onwards, p(a), the ability endowment, ￿, and the idiosyncratic shock to wages, za. Then
Xa = (jP;jC
a ;Aa;p(a);￿;za), with jC
a normalized to zero when consumption is the only choice
variable. ￿ is the degree of parental altruism, a (a) denotes the age of the parent at start (end) of
the adult life and Va(:) is the child￿ s lifetime utility once adult with child education normalized
to zero since in the ￿rst period of adulthood consumption is the only choice variable.
ca and Aa denote, respectively, joint household consumption and ￿nancial assets at age a.
wjP;a is parental wage at age a given parental education level jP. Ia is an indicator function
taking the value of one when the child is sent to school and zero otherwise. If the child is sent to
work, the parent receives the child￿ s wage, wjC;a. If the child is sent to school, the parent pays
the ￿xed costs, FjC, for the jC schooling level attended by the child. E denotes expectations
that re￿ ect uncertainty due to the presence of the uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks to earnings,
z, and ￿ is the discount factor. The utility function is assumed to be strictly increasing and
concave in consumption, so that absolute risk aversion is decreasing in individual￿ s wealth, the
impact of risk on investment decisions being higher for poorer than for wealthier households.12
The optimization problem speci￿ed in (3) is solved under four main constraints. The ￿rst
constraint is a standard period budget constraint with the term in square brackets switching
on when child education becomes a choice variable. The second constraint de￿nes the law of
motion of child￿ s education. The third constraint is a borrowing restriction imposing a limit Ba
on the amount of net indebtedness at age a. The fourth constraint is a terminal condition that
prevents parents from dying in debt: they can not leave debts to their children.
The borrowing limit, Ba, can take any value between zero, which corresponds to the maximum
level of credit constraints of no possible borrowing, and an upper bound that is given by the
present discounted value of lifetime earnings at age a under the lowest possible realization of
individual labor e¢ ciency, that is under the lowest possible realization of the idiosyncratic shock




where ￿ is the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
14z.13 The upper bound represents the maximum amount that an individual will always be able
to repay without violating the no-debt condition speci￿ed in equation (7).14
The household￿ s problem is solved recursively by backwards induction as described in Ap-
pendix B.
3.2 Demand side: aggregate production function
The representative ￿rm operates a constant returns to scale technology over physical and human
capital. I assume that there are no adjustment costs for physical and human capital and no






where Yt denotes aggregate output, Kt is aggregate physical capital and HHt is aggregate
human capital.15 ￿ denotes the share of physical capital in production which is assumed to be
constant over time and Zt is the technology factor that is normalized to one in all years.16 I
assume that the economy is small and open to the world ￿nancial markets. Capital ￿ ows in or
out of the country so that the marginal product of physical capital equals the world interest
rate, r.17
I consider three types of human capital corresponding to the three education levels that the
individuals can complete and I specify the aggregate human capital in year t, Ht, as a nested
CES function over the three types of human capital, H1;H2;H3, which represent, respectively,
the human capital of those completing basic, intermediate and higher education.
The choice of how to combine the three human capital inputs in the HH aggregate is very
important since it determines the elasticity of substitution (ES) between the H factors, which
drives the direction and the magnitude of the general equilibrium e⁄ects. I choose a ￿ exible
speci￿cation for the aggregate human capital that allows for di⁄erent elasticities of substitution
13The empirical distribution of zj is de￿ned over a ￿nite support with a minimum value, zj, and a maximum value, zj.
Therefore, wages are assumed to be always positive and di⁄erent from zero.
14The value of the upper bound arises naturally from the assumption that the utility function satis￿es the Inada condition
lim
c!0
U(c) = ￿1 and that parents have to repay all debts before retiring.
15This speci￿cation of the production function assumes that there are no complementarities between physical and human
capital. This assumption is motivated by the near-constancy of the share of physical capital in production estimated for
LACs in the 1990s (see Bosworth (1998), Harrison (1994) and Ho⁄man (1993)).
16Given the assumption of no population growth and the normalization of Z, there is no growth in steady state. Growth
in the model will only occur during the transition towards a steady state as a result of the reallocation of e¢ ciency units
of labor from less to more productive combinations of the di⁄erent types of human capital.
17In the absence of aggregate shocks, the constancy of the world interest rate implies that the economy￿ s physical to
human capital ratio is ￿xed over time. Also, this assumtion implies that ￿rms face no credit constraints. Di⁄erently from
individual households, they can freely borrow in the international capital markets at the ￿xed rate r. There are no ￿nancial
intermediaries that can borrow money from ￿rms and lend it to households.
15(ES) between human capitals￿pairs. A convenient way to allow for a di⁄erent ES between pairs
of human capital is to combine them within a CES speci￿cation. I use the CES speci￿cation
because it is simple, has few parameters and restricts the substitution elasticities to be constant.
An alternative to the CES is the translog function. However, the translog has many more
parameters to estimate, which would signi￿cantly reduce the degrees of freedom in an already
small sample.
Given three human capital inputs, there are three ways of nesting them within a CES aggre-
gate: g HH1 = ￿1(H3;￿2(H2;H1)); g HH2 = ￿2(H2;￿2(H3;H1)) and g HH3 = ￿3(H1;￿2(H2;H3)),
where ￿1, ￿2 and ￿3 are CES aggregators. The CES functional form imposes symmetry restric-
tions on substitution elasticities. For g HH1, the ES between H3 and H1 is restricted to be the
same as the one between H3 and H2. For g HH2, the ES between H2 and H3 is restricted to
be the same as the one between H2 and H1. These restrictions contrast with factor elasticities
estimated for LACs suggesting that the ES between higher and intermediate education di⁄ers
from the one between either higher or intermediate and basic education.18
For g HH3, the CES restricts the ES between H1 and H2 to be the same as the one between
H1 and H3. This speci￿cation ￿ts an economy with two main sectors, a ￿rst one that employs
low-skilled labor and a second one where production is carried out by using semi and high-
skilled labor. This structure of production is a good description of the Mexican economy that
is characterized by two main sectors: a formal sector of semi and high-skilled workers and an
informal sector of low-skilled workers.
Therefore, HHt is speci￿ed as it follows:







where Hu;t and Hs;t are, respectively, the human capital aggregate for unskilled and skilled
labour at time t:
Hu;t correspond to H1;t and Hs is given by:







The time-varying and skill-speci￿c parameters ￿ and ￿ in equations (9) and (10) denote the
shares of the human capital factors in production. Changes in ￿ and ￿ re￿ ect variations in the
18See Manacorda, Sanchez-Paramo and Schady (2006).
16productivity and in the demand of the di⁄erent inputs. The parameter ￿ determines the ES
between unskilled and skilled labor, which is given by ESu;s = ES1;2 = ES1;3 =
1
1￿￿, while ￿
determines the ES between intermediate and higher education, which is given by ES2;3 =
1
1￿￿.19
If either ￿ or ￿ is zero, the corresponding nesting is Cobb-Douglas. If ￿ > ￿, the elasticity of
substitution between higher and intermediate is lower than the one between either higher or
intermediate and basic education, which means that there are complementarities in production
between intermediate and higher education.
Di⁄erently from physical capital, labor is not internationally mobile and its remuneration is
set domestically. Under the assumption of perfectly competitive markets and pro￿t maximiza-
tion by ￿rms, the price for education level j in year t, pj;t, is given by the marginal product of
the jth aggregate human capital:



















































































where equations (14), (15) and (16) de￿ne, respectively, the relative returns to intermediate
versus basic, higher versus intermediate and higher versus basic education.
The degree of complementarity between intermediate and higher education is an important
19There are di⁄erent ways of measuring the ES when the aggregate output is produced with more than two inputs. We
use the de￿nition of the direct ES. One alternative commonly used de￿nition is the Allen elasticity of substituion. The
direct elasticity of substitution between Intermediate and Higher Education is solely a function of the curvature parameter,
￿, while the Allen de￿nition involves both the curvature parameter and the factor shares.
17determinant of the changes in relative returns. An increase in the amount of human capital at
intermediate level has two di⁄erent e⁄ects: a standard supply e⁄ect (SE) and a complementarity
e⁄ect (CE). The standard SE is clear from the human capitals￿ratio in round brackets in equation
(14) and (15). For a given supply of basic and higher human capital, an increase in H2 decreases
the relative return to intermediate with respect to basic education and increases the relative
return to higher with respect to intermediate education. The CE is given by the term in the
curly brackets in equations 14 and 16. If ￿ > ￿, that is if higher and intermediate education are
more complementary than higher and basic (or intermediate and basic), an increase in H2 further
decreases the relative return to intermediate with respect to basic education and increases the
relative return to higher with respect to basic education.
Activities of the government are not central to the analysis. The government neither collects
taxes nor redistributes them.
4 Equilibrium
Given an initial distribution of ability, ￿nancial assets and education and the world interest rate,
r, a competitive equilibrium is given by a sequence of vectors of skill prices, pt = [p1;t;p2;t;p3;t],
aggregate labor inputs, Ht = [H1;t;H2;t;H3;t], parental decision rules for consumption and edu-
cation choices, [ca;t;Ia;t], individual labor supply of skill j, ja;t, individual labor e¢ ciency, ej;a;t,
age, time and education speci￿c measures, ’j;a;t, for t = 0;1;2;:::, and a = a;:::;a such that:
1. Given the prices [p1;t;p2;t;p3;t], the contingent plans ca;t and Ia;t solve the household maxi-
mization problem 3.












(ja;t(s) ￿ exp(ej;a;t))d’j;a;t(s) 8j
where S de￿nes the state vector at age a, time t, minus the education states, i.e. S ￿
(Aa;t;pt(a);￿;za;t).
18An equilibrium steady state is a competitive equilibrium with stationary prices and distrib-
utions, that is an equilibrium such that [pt;Ht] = [p;H] for all t.
5 Parametrization of the model
This section discusses how I parametrize the model economy.
5.1 Initial distribution of wealth and education
I set the initial distribution of education using the 1987 wave of the Mexican Employment Survey,
the ENEU (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano). A description of the Survey is presented in
Appendix A. I divide the workers into two categories: the adult population that is made up by all
heads of households aged between 25 and 60 with basic, intermediate and higher education and
the population of young living with their parents aged between 15 and 24 with completed basic
and intermediate education. I use the mean proportions by education in the adult population
to set the initial education distribution of the parents and the mean proportions of the young
with basic and intermediate education for the education distribution of the children in the third
and fourth periods. In the pre-school period all children have by de￿nition zero education. In
the second period they all complete compulsory basic education.
The ENEU does not record information on wealth. I use instead the Mexican Expenditure
Survey, the ENIGH (Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares), which is available
in 1984, 1987 and every two years since then and contains detailed information on individuals￿
consumption and assets. I set the initial wealth distribution to a lognormal with mean and
standard deviation from the distribution of ￿nancial assets of workers aged between 25 and 60
in 1992.20
5.2 Preferences and costs of schooling
The coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, ￿, is set to 0.9, which gives a value of around 1.1 for the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). The value is taken from Arrau and Wijnbergen
(1991) that estimate for Mexico a value for the EIS between a lower bound of 0.8 and an upper
bound of 1.4. The limit on net indebtedness, B, is set to zero, which corresponds to the maximum
level of credit constraints. Consumption is adjusted to account for the presence of the child. I
20The ENIGH reached its ￿nal structure only in 1992 with signi￿cant changes in the questionnaire and data collection in
the years before. For this reason, we parametrize the wealth distribution using the ￿rst and second moments of the 1992
instead of the 1987 wave. The results of the simulations are not sensitive to this choice.
19use an equivalence scale equal to 0.7 for a child re￿ ecting the average calories intake of a child
relative to an adult as reported by the Mexican National Nutritional Institute.21 Assuming that
parent-child dynasties are linked by fully altruistic preferences, the altruism parameter, ￿, is set
to one.
I set the values of the ￿xed costs of schooling, Fj, for each jth education level so that the
model matches the education distribution of the workers aged between 25 and 60 in the ENEU
in 1987. I ￿nd F1 = 0:035, F2 = 0:26 and F3 = 0:64, which implies that the costs at intermediate
level are around seven times the ones at primary and the costs at higher education are around
eighteen times the ones at primary.22
5.3 Interest rate and capital share
The value of the real interest rate, r, is set to a US benchmark value. I choose a value of ￿ve
per cent, which is the average real interest rate on the US 6-months Treasury Bills published
by the Federal Reserve Board for the period between the year 1990 and 2000. Given an average
working life of the adult Mexican population of approximately thirty years, the model period is
set to seven years. Therefore, the interest rate in the model is r = (1:057 ￿ 1) ￿ = 0:41. Setting
the yearly discount factor equal to the inverse of (1 + r), ￿ = 1:05￿7 ￿ = 0:71.
The capital share, ￿, is set equal to 0.35, which is the average value between the lower and
the upper bound that has been estimated for LACs.23
5.4 Labor e¢ ciency
The human capital aggregates are de￿ned as the sum of the e¢ ciency weighted labor supplies
of all individuals with a given education level. In order to simulate the model, I need to obtain
an estimate of the mean and variance of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity, ￿, and
of the idiosyncratic shock, z, and an estimate of the coe¢ cients of the education speci￿c age
polynomials, gj. Ideally, I would need a panel data set with individual information on wages, a
21See HernÆndez, ChÆvez and Bourges (1987).
22The Fj intend to measure the total direct costs of education, which include the costs of school material and maintanance.
An empirical counterpart of these costs is provided by the nationally representative Mexican Family House Survey (MxFLS),
which collects high quality data on a rich set of variables for a cross section of Mexican households in 2002. The Survey
contains a detailed set of questions on education costs and distinguishes between tuition fees, the costs of exams, books,
school material, uniforms and the maintenance costs for public and private schools. Summing over the di⁄erent categories
and computing the mean for public and private education, the costs of intermediate education are around eight times the
ones at primary while the ones at higher education are around nineteen times the ones at primary.
23See Bosworth (1998) for a discussion of the empirical issues involved in the estimation of the capital share in Mexico and
Harrison (1994) and Ho⁄man (1993) for two cross-countries empirical studies that use a capital share that varies between
the value of 0.3 and 0.4 for a group of LACs.
20measure of permanent heterogeneity with a measurable impact on wages, such as individual test
scores, and age, spanning over many years. However, for Mexico there are no available data sets
that follow individuals over many years.24 Also, until 2004 there were no standardized measures
of test scores.25
The only available data set with individual-level information on wages and a panel dimension
is the ENEU, which collects wage information on the Mexican urban population of workers at
least twelve years old over ￿ve consecutive quarters, the four quarters of a given year and the
￿rst of the following year. I consider the four quarters of a given year and I specify the following
log wage equation for individual i with education level j in quarter qr:
lnw
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j;qr is the log hourly real wage of individual i with education level j in quarter
qr, lnwj;qr is the mean log wage among those with education level j in quarter qr, gj(:) is an
education-speci￿c quadratic polynomial in age, ￿i is a permanent individual-speci￿c e⁄ect and
zi
j;qr is an i.i.d. shock received by the individual i with education level j in quarter qr.
I construct panels of individuals by matching workers by the position in an identi￿ed house-
hold, number of years of education and age. I consider all wage workers between the age of 15
(minimum legal working age) and 60 (average retirement age) and I follow them over the four
successive quarters in a given year. For each year of the sample between 1987 and 2002 I run
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where the upper-bar variables denote time averages over the four quarters in a given year.
lnw
i
j is the average log wage over the four quarters for the ith individual with the jth education
level, lnwj is the mean log wage over the four quarters for education level j. The term (lnwj;qr￿
lnwj) is modelled as quarter-education dummies￿interactions. gj(agei
qr) is an education-speci￿c
24The ￿rst survey that collects individual information on wages in Mexico over many years is the Mexican Family Life
Survey (MxFLS). The ￿rst wave of the MxFLS was collected in 2002 and it will be followed by two additional waves with
retrospective information in order to build up a uniquely rich longitudinal database that spans over a period of at least ten
years. However, as of today, only the 2002 wave is available for use by the general public.
25Non-standardized test scores were collected in Mexico since 1998 (Estandares Nacionales). In 2001 the ENLACE
(ENgaging LAtino Communities for Education) initiative was launched to support Latino students to progress from primary
to secondary and college education. Standardized test scores started to be collected as part of ENLACE in 2004.
21Figure 2: Ability Distribution in 1987 (Source: ENEU)
quadratic polynomial in age.
For the purposes of the simulation we require the unconditional distribution of ability as









where T(i) is the total number of observations available on individual i. The estimated
￿xed-e⁄ects give an estimate of the distribution of ￿ over the working population.
Figure 2 presents the empirical frequencies of ￿ obtained for 1987, the ￿rst year of the sample.
The ￿rst and second moment of the distribution of ￿ are used to parametrize the distribution
of ability in the model. I ￿nd b ￿
2
￿ = 0:25 and b ￿￿ = 0.26
The short length of the panel with only four observations on wages for each individual biases
the estimates of the ￿xed e⁄ects. Despite this limitation, the lack of alternative data sources with
successive observations on wages and measurable proxies of permanent heterogeneity restricts
to this regression the best that we can do to obtain an estimate of ￿ that is consistent with
the estimated human capital aggregates. One alternative that I am exploring with is to use the
distribution of the results from the Raven test for adult individuals collected by the MxFLS in
2002.
However, disregarding the speci￿c initial ability distribution estimated from the data, what
is relevant for the research question addressed in this paper is to assess the contribution of the
26The distribution of ability is taken to be time-invariant. We therefore ignore any possible heterogeneity in terms of
ability endownments between successive cohorts active in the labour market in di⁄erent years.
22changes in the ability composition by education with respect to the changes in the skill prices
to produce the convexi￿cation.
The results in BMM provide a precise benchmark of the size of the changes in mean ability by
education in Latin America in the 1990s. At the end of section 6.3 I will use model￿ s simulations
to compare the changes in composition estimated by BMM to the changes in mean ability by
education that are needed in this model to produce the convexi￿cation in the absence of any
general equilibrium price e⁄ect.







qr) ￿ lnwj;qr ￿ ￿
i (22)
I use the residuals from the wage equation to obtain an estimate of the distribution of the
idiosyncratic shock. I assume that zj;qr is a normally distributed i.i.d. shock with mean zero
and variance ￿2
zj. I use the second moment of the distribution of zj;qr for each education group
to parametrize the distribution of z in the model. For 1987 I ￿nd b ￿
2





z3 = 0:079. Table 6 in Appendix A presents the estimated variances for each year of the
sample between 1987 and 2002.
Finally, the coe¢ cients of the quadratic polynomials gj(agei
qr) provide the estimates of the
education-speci￿c experience e⁄ects in quarter qr. Table 7 in Appendix A presents the (yearly
rescaled) estimates of the age and age squared term for each education group and year between
1987 and 2002.
5.5 Human capital aggregates
Following Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998), I identify the human capital aggregates, Hj;t,
by combining the data on the wage bills paid in each year to the di⁄erent education groups with
the time series of the skill prices estimated for each year between 1987 and 2002.
Let us de￿ne the wage bill WBj;t as the total earnings￿payments received by the individuals
of a given education group in a given year. Then:
WBj;t = b pj;t ￿ Hj;t j = 1;2;3 (23)








































Figure 3: Wage Workers (Source: ENIGH)
Normalizing to one the value of each of the b pj in 1987, it is possible to identify the series of
the utilized human capital stocks normalized to 1987.
In order to compute the wage bills we need a data set that is representative of the entire
Mexican population. The ENEU collects information on urban areas only so it can not be
used to this purpose. I use instead the ENIGH, that is nationally-representative and reports
individual earnings together with detailed information on assets and consumption.
For each year and education group I compute the wage bill by summing over the individual
earnings of all primary wage earners between the age of 15 and 60. I linearly interpolate the
available data for the missing years. The total number of workers and the wage bills by education
for each year between 1987 and 2002 are reported in Figure 3 and 4. The drop of the wage bills
between 1994 and 1996 is the result of the Peso crisis that hit Mexico in 1994: the total wage
bill declined in real terms by around 29 per cent at basic and by around 35 and 48 per cent
at intermediate and higher education. Wages started increasing again steadily for all education
levels from the end of the 1990s.
In order to obtain an estimate of the pj;t I run the ￿xed e⁄ect regression described in equation
(20) for each year of the sample between 1987 and 2002 and I compute the predicted mean log
hourly real wage for each education level net of the ￿xed e⁄ects. Given the wage bills and














































Figure 4: Wage Bills (Source: ENIGH)
obtain the time series of the human capital aggregates for each year and education group. The
identi￿cation of the H factors is then consistent with the ability distribution estimated from the
data and used to simulate the model.27
Figure 5 and 6 present the series of the estimated skill prices and human capital stocks
normalized to 1987. As in the aggregate wage bills, the impact of the Peso crisis does also shows
up in the skill prices: between 1994 and 1996 the log skill price decreased by around 12 per cent
at basic and by around 10 per cent at intermediate and higher education.
Each of the three human capital aggregates show a positive growth in the 1990s but with a
rather non-monotonic trend. In particular, the growth of H3 dropped sharply between 1994 and
1996 and the one of H2 became positive only from the year 2000. The decrease (increase) in the
value of the estimated H is due to an increase (decrease) in the level of the estimated prices of
the corresponding H factor which grew proportionally more (less) than the total remuneration
of the factor.
27Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) assume that at older ages changes in wages are solely due to changes in skill prices
and do not depend any more on ability. Under a normalization assumption that b pj;t=0 = 1 8j, it is possible to estimate
the time series of the skill prices from a cross-section of wages of adult individuals. Then, if the ratios have mean zero
measurement error, we can estimate the ratio of the skill prices without bias and, with these relative skill prices at hand,
obtain an estimate of the human capitals. Following Heckman, Lochner and Taber￿ s procedure, we can estimate the skill
price ratios by using the mean log wages by education for the ENEU workers in each year of the sample between 1987 and
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Figure 6: Human Capital Aggregates
265.6 Aggregate technology
The parameters of the production function can be estimated by using the expressions for the
returns to schooling in equation (14) to (16).
Log linearizing equation (15), I obtain:
(logp3;t ￿ logp2;t) = [log￿3;t ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿3;t)] + (￿ ￿ 1)(logH3;t ￿ logH2;t) (25)
where log￿j;t denotes the time series of the relative demand shifts for skill level j measured
in log quantity units. By rewriting the above expression in terms of wage bills, I obtain:
(logWB3;t ￿ logWB2;t) = [log￿3;t ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿3;t)] + ￿(logH3;t ￿ logH2;t) (26)
Equation 26 can be used to obtain a direct estimate of the elasticity of substitution between
higher and intermediate education. The time-varying factor shares ￿2;t and ￿3;t re￿ ect changes
in the productivity and in the demand of workers with intermediate and higher education. Given
the signi￿cant shifts in educational attainment observed in Mexico in the 1990s, I express the
log of the share parameters as the sum of a constant and a time-varying component:
log￿j;t = ￿0;j + ￿1;j ￿ t + ej;t (27)
where ￿0;j is a skill-speci￿c constant, t denotes a linear time trend and ej;t is a normally
distributed i.i.d. shock at time t for skill level j.28
Combining equation (26) and (27), the value of the parameter determining the elasticity of
substitution between higher and intermediate education, ￿, can be estimated from a regression
of the ratio of log wage bills on the ratio of the human capital aggregates, a linear trend and a
constant. In order to correct for a possible endogeneity bias I apply an IV estimator using as
instrument the ￿rst lag of the di⁄erence of the logs of the human capital factors.
Then, I use equation (10) above to construct a measure of skilled human capital. To do so,
we need an estimate of the log factor shares ￿3;t. Given equations (26) and (27) and the fact





= (￿0 + ￿1 ￿ t); where ￿0 = (￿0;3 ￿ ￿0;2) and
￿1 = (￿1;3 ￿ ￿1;2). Therefore, ￿3;t =
exp(￿0+￿1￿t)
(1+exp(￿0+￿1￿t)):
Finally, I can estimate a regression of the ratio of log wage bills for skilled and unskilled
on the ratio of skilled and unskilled human capital, a linear trend and a constant to obtain an
28Given the spike in the wage bills in 1994 (see Figure 3.4), we tried alternative speci￿cations that allow the trend to
vary for the pre and post 1994 period. However, the interaction term never turns out to be signi￿cant.
27estimate of ￿.
Parameter Higher versus Intermediate Skilled versus Unskilled
Di⁄erence log H 0:7726 0:8601
(0:0636) (0:1362)




Implied ES 4:4 7:1
Table 2: Estimation of the Production Function, standard errors in parenthesis
Table 2 presents the estimates obtained for higher versus intermediate education and for
skilled versus unskilled. The estimates of ￿ and ￿ are consistent with the presence of comple-
mentarities between intermediate and higher education: ￿ > ￿. The value for the ES between
higher and intermediate (skilled and unskilled) is of around 4.4 (7.1). These results con￿rm the
presence of important complementarities in production between workers with intermediate and
college education that has been found by BMM for Brazil.29
A joint estimation of the system of equations to test for the equality of the coe¢ cients of the
log relative supplies con￿rms that ￿ and ￿ are statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent. The test gives
a value of chi-squared of 7.1 with a P-value of 0.0077. I also test for the assumption of equality
between ES3;1 and ES2;1, which is a restriction imposed by the symmetry of the CES operator.
The test gives a value of chi-squared of 0.35 with a P-value of 0.5525. Therefore, the test can
not reject the null hypothesis of equal coe¢ cients.
Using the wage bill equation for skilled and unskilled, the equivalent of equation 27 for ￿s;t
and the de￿nition of the unskilled labor share as one minus the skilled share, I can identify ￿s;t
following the same steps used to identify ￿3;t. For the year 1987, I obtain a baseline estimate of
0.55 for ￿3 and of 0.692 for ￿s. Given the estimated series of b ￿3;t and b ￿s;t, b ￿2;t = (b ￿s;t￿b ￿3;t) and
b ￿u;t = (1 ￿ b ￿s;t). Figure 7 presents the estimated shares of the three human capital aggregates
in each year between 1987 and 2002: an increase in the share of higher education came togheter
with a decline in the share of intermediate and basic education.
The coe¢ cient of the time trend gives an estimate of the yearly relative demand-shift of higher
29Manacorda, Sanchez-Paramo and Schady (2006) use a cross section of LACs that includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia and Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s and ￿nd a value of around 4.5 for the ES between higher and intermediate
education and a value of around 2.5 for the ES between skilled and unskilled. Therefore, they ￿nd a lower ES between
skilled and unskilled than between higher and intermediate. They allow for a di⁄erent ES between age groups and they



























Figure 7: CES Shares, Mexico
with respect to intermediate education, (￿1;3 ￿ ￿1;2), and of skilled with respect to unskilled
labor, (￿1;s ￿ ￿1;u). I call (￿1;s ￿ ￿1;u) the "skill-bias" parameter. It gives a measure of the
annual increase in the relative demand for skilled labour in production. The estimate in Table 2
gives a value of the "skill-bias" of around 1.35 per cent a year. I will use the estimated 1.35 per
cent a year to model SBTC as a permanent increase in the share of skilled labor in production
starting from the baseline value of ￿s estimated for 1987.
6 Simulations
In this section I simulate the model for a quantitative assessment of the determinants of the
convexi￿cation. I de￿ne the baseline economy as the one with the share of skilled labor ￿xed at
the value estimated in 1987 and the highest level of credit constraints of no possible borrowing.
Then, I assess the role of an increased demand for skill by simulating the model in the presence of
a SBTC at constant supply and in general equilibrium, with and without the complementarities
in production between intermediate and higher education. Finally, I simulate the impact of a
SBTC for di⁄erent levels of credit constraints and earnings￿risk. I compare the education prices
at steady state in the di⁄erent scenarios to assess what determines the convex shape.
6.1 Skill-biased technological change
A SBTC is modelled as a permanent increase of ￿s, which measures the contribution of skilled

































Figure 8: Skill-Biased Technological Change - Partial versus General Equilibrium
an increase in the productivity or in the demand for skilled labor. The size of the increase is
given by the "skill-bias" parameter obtained from the estimation of the production function in
section 5.6. As reported in Table 2, I estimate a skill-bias of around 0.0135 a year. The value
of ￿s estimated for 1987 is used as the baseline case that de￿nes the no-SBTC scenario. Then,
starting from this value, I increase ￿s by 1.35 per cent a year for ￿ve consecutive years and I
keep it constant at the increased value from the sixth year onwards.30
I de￿ne the baseline economy as the one with no-SBTC and the maximum level of credit
constraints of no possible borrowing. I assess the impact of a SBTC in two consecutive steps.
First, I compute the equilibrium prices that the model would produce given the increase in ￿s
in the absence of any general equilibrium supply e⁄ect. I compute the skill prices by using the
equilibrium conditions (11) to (13) and I simulate the model assuming that the supply of each
skill is kept ￿xed at the value estimated in the ENEU in 1987. I call this counterfactual Scenario
I. Then, I de￿ne a second counterfactual where the supply is allowed to change in reaction to
the SBTC and thus to the associated changes in the prices of skills. I call this counterfactual
Scenario II.
Figure 8 presents the equilibrium log prices at steady state in the baseline case and in
Scenario I and II. At baseline the model matches the education shares in 1987 and produces a
linear relationship between the mean log prices and the level of education.
Once the share of skilled labor is increased, Scenario I produces a steeper prices￿schedule. As

































Figure 9: Complementarities Intermediate - Higher Education
clear from equations (11) to (13) and the fact that ￿u = (1￿￿s), an increase in ￿s decreases the
equilibrium price at basic and increases the prices at both intermediate and higher education.
With respect to the baseline, both the relative returns to higher with respect to intermediate
and to intermediate with respect to basic education increase. Moreover, they increase by the
same amount; therefore, the price schedule is steeper than at baseline but it is still a linear
function of the level of education.
Scenario II allows the supply of skills to react to the changes in the prices. Therefore, the
di⁄erence with respect to scenario I is due to the supply reaction to a SBTC. The increase
in the prices at intermediate and higher education gives incentives to invest after compulsory
schooling. However, the supply at the intermediate increases more than at the higher level, so
the price at intermediate decreases more and the steady state prices￿schedule becomes convex.
The complementarity between intermediate and higher education is driving this result. Since
I estimated a value of ￿ that is higher than the value of ￿, in addition to the standard supply
e⁄ect, an increase in H2 further decreases the relative return to intermediate with respect to
basic education and increases the relative return to higher with respect to basic education.
Figure 9 quanti￿es the importance of the complementarities between intermediate and higher
education. I de￿ne a third counterfactual, Scenario III, which assumes that the ES between
higher and intermediate is the same as the one between higher and basic education. As it is
clear from the graph, in the absence of any complementarity between intermediate and higher
31education, the equilibrium wage pro￿le in steady state is back to being a linear function of the
level of education.
All the results up to now have been obtained for the degree of earnings￿risk estimated for
1987 and the maximum level of credit constraints of no possible borrowing. Both an increase
in the level of risk and in the amount that is possible to borrow would change the stock of
available resources and therefore the incentives to invest in education. In the following para-
graphs I investigate the role of a change in the level of risk and credit constraints to produce
the convexi￿cation.
6.2 Uninsurable earnings￿risk
The level of uninsurable earnings￿risk has a direct impact on the amount of human capital
investment. Positive (negative) shocks can change the fortune of dynasties that are born poor
(rich) and allow some families to (or not to) have enough resources to ￿nance educational
investments up to higher education.
In Section 5.4 I estimated the variance of the earnings￿shock by education for each year
between 1987 and 2002. The estimates are reported in Table 6 in Appendix A. For each education
group, I take the highest estimated value of the variance and I use these estimates to de￿ne a
fourth counterfactual, Scenario IV, that is given by Scenario II with the high variances of the
shocks. From the estimated values of 0:065, 0:07 and 0:079 for the variance of the shock to basic,
intermediate and higher education, the values are increased to, respectively, 0:078, 0:094 and
0:125. Figure 10 reports the steady state prices￿schedule at baseline and in Scenario II and IV.
The possibility of receiving big positive shocks that could allow ￿nancing education up to
the highest level increases the option value of education as a pro￿table investment opportunity
and gives incentives to invest in education after compulsory schooling. Therefore, the supply at
basic declines and the one at intermediate increases with a corresponding increase in the price
of basic and a decrease in the price of intermediate education. However, a high level of risk
also means that there is a positive probability of receiving big negative shocks and therefore not
being able to invest up to higher education: the increase in the supply at intermediate is not big
enough to produce the sizable drop in the price at this level, which is the characterizing feature
of the convexi￿cation.

































Figure 10: Increase in Earnings￿Risk
now investigate how the results change when borrowing is allowed.
6.3 Credit constraints
The assumption of no possible borrowing signi￿cantly restricts the set of feasible educational
investments and the extent of mobility from basic up to higher education. I am not aware of any
estimate of the actual degree of credit constraints in Mexico, so there is no empirical benchmark
to ￿x the value of Ba, the maximum amount that is possible to borrow at each age a.
As I discussed in section 3.1, the internal consistency of the model allows to set an upper
bound for the value that B can take at any age, which is given by the present discounted
value of the lifetime earnings at age a under the lowest possible realization of the idiosyncratic
education-speci￿c shock zj. Given the distribution of zj de￿ned over a ￿nite support with a
minimum value, zj, and a maximum value, zj, zj de￿nes the lowest possible value that zj can
take. By substituting zj in ei
j;a, I compute ei
j;a =
￿
￿i + gj(agei) + zj
￿
. At each age a, given












(1+r)t where r is the world
interest rate.
I de￿ne a ￿fth counterfactual, Scenario V, that is given by Scenario II with a relaxation of
the credit constraints to the upper bound of the values that B can take. Figures 11 reports the
wage pro￿le at steady state in the baseline and in Scenario II and V.
With respect to scenario II, the possibility of borrowing allows more people to complete

































Figure 11: Relaxation of the Credit Constraints
and therefore the prices decrease. However, the supply increase at intermediate level does not
translate into a proportional increase at higher education, so the price at intermediate decreases
more than at the higher level.
With respect to the baseline, the relative return to higher versus intermediate increases and
the relative return to intermediate versus basic education decreases with the price at intermediate
falling below the value at baseline.
There is a positive relationship between the borrowing limit and the size of the supply increase
at intermediate: the more it is possible to borrow, the higher is the investment in education after
compulsory schooling. Unreported results show that there is a borrowing threshold of around
forty per cent of individuals￿lifetime earnings below which the size of the supply increase at
intermediate is not enough to produce a sizeable decrease in the equilibrium price below the
value at baseline.
Scenario V presents all the features that characterize the convexi￿cation in Mexico. The
second column of Table 3 and 4 presents, respectively, the growth of the level and of the log
relative prices between 1987 and 2002 estimated from equation 20 using the ENEU; columns 3 to
7 present, respectively, the growth of the level and of the relative log education prices at steady
state in each of the ￿ve scenarios with respect to the baseline case. Only in the ￿fth scenario the
price at intermediate falls below the value at baseline. Also, the size of the decline is very close
to the one estimated in the data. In terms of relative returns, Scenario V predicts an increase
34of around 75 per cent of the relative returns to higher with respect to intermediate education
and a decline of around 26 per cent of the relative returns to intermediate with respect to basic
education, which are close in magnitude to the ones estimated from the ENEU.
Log price education ENEU (1987-200) I II III IV V
Basic ￿3% ￿9% ￿2% ￿7% 5% ￿2%
Intermediate ￿5% 13% 3% 7% 0% ￿6%
Higher 6% 20% 16% 17% 10% 10%
Table 3: Growth of the Level of Log Education Prices With Respect to Baseline
Log relative prices ENEU (1987-200) I II III IV V
Higher versus Intermediate 72% 50% 69% 50% 200% 75%
Higher versus Basic 25% 78% 52% 19% 139% 34%
Intermediate versus Basic ￿15% 119% 28% ￿26% 48% ￿26%
Table 4: Growth of the Relative Log Education Prices With Respect to Baseline
As expected, the change in the wage pro￿le from linear to convex came together with signif-
icant changes in the mean ability level by education. Table 5 presents the mean and standard
deviation of the ability level by education at Baseline and in Scenario V. The supply increase
at intermediate results into a sharp decline in the mean ability at this level and into an increase
in the mean ability at basic education. Due to the entrance of low-ability individuals together
with high-ability ones, the mean ability does also decline at higher education. However, the
reduction in mean ability at intermediate is of a much bigger magnitude than the one at higher
education. Therefore, with respect to the Baseline, in Scenario V the ability gap between higher
and intermediate education increases sharply.
Ability by Education Baseline Scenario V
mean sd mean sd
Basic ￿0:226 0:396 0:311 0:276
Intermediate 0:396 0:314 ￿0:191 0:436
Higher 0:615 0:283 0:358 0:536
Table 5: Mean and Standard Deviation of Ability by Education in Scenario V and at Baseline
The changes in the mean ability by education were substantial but were not driving the
convexi￿cation. As shown in Figure 11, the convexi￿cation resulted from changes in the prices
of education, which is the component of the observed wages that remains once ability has been
accounted for.
35However, the quantitative importance of the changes in ability composition is sensitive to
the speci￿c ability distribution estimated from the data. More importantly, with a big enough
drop in the mean ability at intermediate and a big enough increase in the mean ability at higher
education, the model would always be able to produce a convexi￿ed wage pro￿le, which would
be the result of compositional changes with no role left for price e⁄ects.
I can test the relevance of this argument by simulating the economy at constant skill prices
and compute the changes in mean ability that are needed to produce the convexi￿cation. To
my knowledge, BMM is the ￿rst paper that provides an estimate of the changes in the ability
distribution by education in a Latin American country. They distinguish between four levels of
schooling and estimated the changes in ability composition by education and birth cohort during
the educational expansion in Brazil in the 1990s. These estimates provide a precise benchmark
of the magnitude of the shifts in mean ability by education in Latin America in the 1990s.
Unreported results show that the changes in the mean ability by education that were necessary
to produce the convexi￿cation in the absence of any general equilibrium price e⁄ect would be
more than ￿ve times bigger than the ones estimated by BMM.31 The convexi￿cation was not
driven by compositional changes. The fundamental determinants of the shift in the wage pro￿le
from linear to convex were changes in the prices of skills.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies a central feature that characterizes the changes in wage inequality in Latin
America in the 1990s: the combination of an increase in the wage di⁄erential between higher
and intermediate education and a decline in the di⁄erential between intermediate and basic
education driven by a drop in the real wage at intermediate. From being linear at the beginning
of the 1990s, by the end of the decade the relationship between mean wages and the level of
education became convex. This has important implications for the process of human capital
accumulation. From one side, the non-linearity of the wage function changes the opportunity
costs of investing in education, from the other, it re￿ ects changes in its supply. Yet, the empirical
31A similar argument could be made for the estimates of the ￿xed costs of education, Fj. By changing the costs of schooling
so that enough people move from basic to intermediate and to higher education the model would mechanically produce the
convexi￿cation. Estimates of average costs by level of education can be computed from the ENIGH. Despite collecting less
detailed information on schooling costs than the MxFLS, the ENIGH is available every two years since 1992, thus allowing
to estimate a time series of average costs. Unreported results show that in the absence of general equilibrium price e⁄ects
the changes in Fj that are necessary to produce the convexi￿cation di⁄er signi￿cantly from the changes estimated from the
ENIGH. In particular, while the estimates from the ENIGH show that the average costs increased at all schooling levels,
the model would produce a convexi￿cation only in the presence of a substantial decrease in the ￿xed costs of intermediate
education.
36literature on LACs so far has taken the supply of education as given and has focused primarily
on the increase in the wage di⁄erential between higher and intermediate education.
Using micro-data from Mexico between 1987 and 2002 I show that the convexi￿cation was
not the result of changes in the ability composition by level of education but rather of changes
in the prices of schooling in a period of economic reforms that many empirical studies have asso-
ciated with an increased demand for skilled labour in production. The results of the simulations
show that there are two main determinants of the convexi￿cation. First, the combination of
an increase in the relative return to higher and a decline in the relative return to intermedi-
ate education is due to the presence of complementarities in production between intermediate
and higher education. The increased demand for skill increases the return at intermediate and
higher education and gives incentives to invest after compulsory schooling. Since higher educa-
tion is more complementary with intermediate than is basic education, the increased supply at
intermediate increases the relative return to higher with respect to basic education and further
decreases the relative return to intermediate versus basic education. Second, the drop in the
price at intermediate and therefore the extent of the convexi￿cation depends on the extent of
binding credit constraints at intermediate education.
The model developed in this paper is rather stylized but it is meant to include all main
factors that could have been driving the convexi￿cation. An important simplifying assumption
is the absence of migration to the US. According to the statistics presented in the 2001 Report
published by the US Center for Immigration Studies, in the 1990s Mexico was the largest source
of migration to the US accounting for around thirty per cent of all immigrants there. The
migration to the US was mainly an out￿ ow of low-skilled workers with two thirds of the adult
Mexican immigrants having not completed intermediate education.32 The low-skilled migration
on its own would not be able to explain the double change in the relative wages but it could
have contributed to reduce the fall in the wage at basic education and therefore to produce the
decline in the relative returns to intermediate education. In this paper I consider cross-sections
of adult individuals working in Mexico between 1987 and 2002. I ￿nd that the share of workers
with basic education decreased from around sixty per cent in 1987 to thirty-eight per cent in
2002. Consistently, from the estimation of the production function I identify an increase in the
relative demand for workers with more than basic education. Finally, model￿ s simulations show
that the decrease in the demand for basic educated workers more than compensated the price
32The Report can be freely downloaded from the website of the US Center for Immigration Studies: www.cis.org
37increase induced by the decline in the supply at this level. It could be an interesting topic for
future research to disentangle the downward pressure on wages due to the demand decrease for
low-skilled workers and the upper pressure due to the migration of this type of workers to the
US.
Despite being stylized, the model￿ s ￿ndings have strong empirical support. First, as I docu-
mented in section 1.1, an increased demand for skilled labour in production has been found by
many empirical studies on Mexican economy in the 1990s. Second, a relaxation of the credit
constraints does also ￿nd empirical support. The decade of the 1990s was characterized by a
process of ￿nancial liberalization and deregulation of the securities markets, which resulted into
an increased availability of credit to the private sector. As documented by Bandiera, Caprio,
Honohan and Schiantarelli (2000), two common measures of monetary depth such as the M2
aggregate and the ratio of the total credit to the private sector as a percentage of the gross
national GDP steeply increased in Mexico in the ￿rst half of the 1990s.
Of course, the question remains as to why the relaxation of the credit constraints was not of
a big enough size as to allow the supply increase at intermediate to translate into a proportional
increase at higher education. Credit constraints is a general label to capture all ￿nancial and
non-￿nancial factors that are relevant for grade progression. Among these factors an important
role is played by the quality of education received earlier on, which in Latin America di⁄ers
signi￿cantly at all education levels between private and public schools. Estimating a dynamic
model of school progression that includes the choice between private and public education would
allow estimating the returns to education in the two sectors and help understanding the actual
nature of the constraints and the time when they start to be binding. A complementary paper
to the analysis developed in this paper is investigating these questions.
The results of this paper con￿rm the ￿nding by Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) and Lee
and Wolpin (2006) that the GE e⁄ects of changes in the supply of skills on their prices are an
important determinant of the evolution of wage inequality. In addition, they provide an empirical
test of the steady-state theory of equilibrium wage functions developed by Mookherjee and Ray
(2007). In an equilibrium model of savings and occupational choices without any stochastic
shock and individual heterogeneity, Mookherjee and Ray derive the theoretical implication of a
convex relationship between the skill-intensity of an occupation and its marginal rate of return.
The analysis developed in this paper adds to the existing literature by showing that an
equilibrium model with endogenous skill prices could be crucial to understand the driving factors
38of the recent trend in wage inequality. Together with the convexi￿cation in Latin America, there
is extensive evidence of a convexi￿ed wage pro￿le by years of education in the US as well as in
some Asian countries.33 More generally, the growing literature documenting an increase in wage
inequality driven by rising remunerations to the top percentiles of the earnings￿distribution34
suggests that an underlying convexi￿cation of the returns to skills could be the driving feature
of the recent changes in inequality.
Finally, the model developed in this paper could be used to address an interesting and
related question concerning the timing of the convexi￿cation. In this paper I have focused on
the equilibrium steady state in order to explain the equilibrium wage pro￿le at two points in
time. Following the recent empirical literature that employs dynamic GE models to explain the
changes in wage inequality,35 the model could be used to study the economy in transition between
1987 and 2002. The main goal would be to explain the path of changes in the skill distribution
and in the education prices that resulted into the convexi￿cation. A welfare analysis of who
has been winning and loosing in the process and by how much would complete the quantitative
exercise. This is left for future research.
33See Deschenes (2006) and Lemieux (2006, 2007) for the US and Liu (2006) for Vietnam.
34See Atkinson (2003) for the UK, Banerjee and Piketty (2005) for India, Piketty (2005) for France, Feenberg and Poterba
(2000) and Piketty and Saez (2003) for the US.
35See, for example, Lee and Wolpin (2006) and Johnson and Keane (2007).
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45Appendix A - Data
ENEU
The ENEU (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano) is the Mexican national employment
survey collected yearly by the Mexican national statistical o¢ ce, INEGI. The ENEU has a
structure similar to the US Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). It is a quarterly household
survey that collects individual-level data and it has a rotating panel structure: households are
interviewed for ￿ve consecutive quarters and in each quarter twenty per cent of the households
are replaced by new households that are interviewed for the ￿rst time. The survey started in 1981
with progressive increase of the geographic coverage. The sample is selected to be geographically
and socio economically representative of the Mexican urban population: by the end of the 1990s
it covered approximately sixty two per cent of the national urban population and ninety two
per cent of the cities with population greater than one hundred thousand people. By the end of
the 1990s, approximately seventy four per cent of the Mexican population lived in urban areas.
Recent rounds of the ENEU have national coverage, but since the earlier ones survey urban
areas only, I restrict the sample to urban areas in all years.
The main questionnaire is divided in three parts. The ￿rst part collects socio demographic
information on all household members. The second part contains detailed employment infor-
mation on individuals at least twelve years old. The third part reports information on the
characteristics of the house of residence with additional questions on the characteristics of the
building, number and type of rooms and ownership status from the 1994 wave onwards. The em-
ployment information is very detailed with several questions on individuals￿occupation status,
type and characteristics of employment, sector of main and secondary job, contract type, num-
ber of working hours, monthly earnings, unemployment status and duration and social security
taxes paid by the worker￿ s employer in the private and public sector. Earnings are reported net
of all labor taxes and social contributions paid in either public or private funds.
Construction of the education groups
The Mexican education system consists of four main cycles: pre-school, primary, secondary
(lower and upper) and post-secondary (University/technical institutes or more) education.
Pre-school education is between age 3 and 6 and is provided free of charge. In December 2001,
the Mexican Congress voted to make one year of pre-school education mandatory, a provision
that went into e⁄ect in 2004. Primary education starts at age 6, it lasts six years and it
46has always been compulsory. Secondary education comprises two main levels: lower and upper
secondary. Lower secondary lasts between three to four years, depending on the program. Upper
secondary lasts three years. Both levels includes an "academic" and a "vocational" branch that
paves the way, respectively, to University and non-University education. In 1993 lower secondary
became compulsory. The policy change mainly a⁄ected rural areas with a large increase in the
construction of schools and corresponding increasing attainment rates at lower secondary in
these areas. Post-secondary education comprises Universities, 4-years technical institutes and
2-years technical institutes. By far the majority of students are enrolled in universities and a
very small proportion is enrolled in 2-years technical institutes. University takes four to ￿ve
years and graduate education lasts between two to four years (two years are necessary to obtain
a Master degree and two additional years to obtain a PhD).
In order to construct the three education groups used in the model, the schooling levels have
been aggregated as it follows. The "basic education" group includes all individuals that have
up to uncompleted upper secondary education, the "intermediate education" group includes all
individuals that have up to uncompleted University education and the "higher education" group
includes individuals who have completed University or more. As in Manacorda, Sanchez-Paramo
and Schady (2006), I aggregated the academic and vocational branch of secondary education
by considering in the "intermediate" group all individuals that have completed any of the two
branches.
At the beginning of the 1990s attainment rates at primary education were above 90 per cent
in all Mexico and at lower secondary they were above 80 per cent in urban areas and below 40
per cent in rural areas. Focusing on urban areas motivates the choice of grouping primary and
lower secondary into compulsory basic education. The four model￿ s periods reproduce the four
main stages of the education cycle. For simplicity, the length of each period is assumed to be
the same and equal to seven years in order to match an average working life of adult Mexican
workers of around thirty years.
Estimation of the wage equations
I estimate the wage equations by considering all wage workers between the age of 15 and
60. Hourly wages are computed as the ratio between monthly earnings and hours worked in the
main occupation last month. The data are de￿ ated using the Mexican national CPI as of June
2002.
Table 6 and 7 report the estimates of the variance of the residuals and of the yearly rescaled
47coe¢ cients of the age polynomials by education group for each year between 1987 and 2002.
Year Basic Intermediate Higher
1987 0.065 0.070 0.079
1988 0.065 0.074 0.088
1989 0.070 0.077 0.117
1990 0.068 0.084 0.119
1991 0.069 0.087 0.113
1992 0.069 0.083 0.106
1993 0.065 0.083 0.113
1994 0.070 0.084 0.115
1995 0.073 0.085 0.110
1996 0.068 0.083 0.111
1997 0.064 0.078 0.099
1998 0.066 0.083 0.099
1999 0.078 0.094 0.121
2000 0.078 0.094 0.125
2001 0.063 0.076 0.099
2002 0.071 0.089 0.114
Table 6: Variance of the Residuals - Estimation Wage Equations (Source: ENEU)
Year Basic Intermediate Higher
age age squared age age squared age age squared
1987 0.098 -0.005 0.122 -0.004 0.274 -0.012
1988 0.079 -0.004 0.188 -0.008 0.302 -0.014
1989 0.092 -0.005 0.194 -0.010 0.320 -0.015
1990 0.116 -0.006 0.167 -0.007 0.303 -0.013
1991 0.118 -0.006 0.102 -0.004 0.264 -0.011
1992 0.096 -0.005 0.279 -0.013 0.224 -0.010
1993 0.121 -0.006 0.170 -0.006 0.204 -0.009
1994 0.168 -0.009 0.257 -0.010 0.184 -0.007
1995 0.171 -0.008 0.253 -0.011 0.216 -0.008
1996 0.161 -0.008 0.166 -0.006 0.243 -0.009
1997 0.108 -0.005 0.236 -0.010 0.281 -0.012
1998 0.104 -0.005 0.106 -0.003 0.182 -0.006
1999 0.131 -0.007 0.131 -0.005 0.228 -0.010
2000 0.118 -0.006 0.162 -0.006 0.253 -0.010
2001 0.108 -0.006 0.104 -0.003 0.186 -0.007
2002 0.124 -0.006 0.129 -0.005 0.196 -0.007
Table 7: Age Polynomials - Estimation Wage Equations (Source: ENEU)
48Appendix B - Solution method
This Appendix describes the method used to compute the equilibrium steady state of the
model. The model is solved recursively by backwards induction from the last to the ￿rst period
of adult life.
Step 1. Set an initial guess of the vector of the skill prices [p1;p2;p3] and assume that future
prices equal current prices. [p1;p2;p3] gives an initial guess of p(a), the vector of the skill prices
forecasted from age a onwards.
Step 2. Solve the optimization problem in the last period of work life before retirement (a =
a).
De￿ne with V Sch
a (jP;jC
a ;Aa;p(a);￿;za) and with V Work
a (jP;jC
a ;Aa;p(a);￿;za), respectively,
the conditional value function of sending the child to school and to work and denote with
W Sch
a (jP
a ;Aa;p(a);￿;za) and W Work
a (jP
a ;Aa;p(a);￿;za) the initial guess for child lifetime utility
as an adult conditional on having sent the child, respectively, to school and to work in the last
period of coresidence. a denotes the age of the parent in the ￿rst period of adult life.
Given W Sch
a (:) and W Work
a (:), V Sch
a (:) and V Work













































where r is the ￿xed real interest rate on ￿nancial assets, FjC denotes the ￿xed costs of
schooling for child education level jC and wjP;a and wjC;a are, respectively, parental and child
wage at age a given parental (child) education level jP(jC). ￿ denotes the degree of parental
altruism and expectations are taken over next period shock to earnings, z. Equations (28) and
(29) describe the evolution of child education that increases by one unit if the child is sent to
school. The level of child education at the end of the last period of coresidence de￿nes the (￿xed)
49education level throughout adulthood (jC
a = jP
a = jP). For simplicity I do not report the credit
constraint (6) and the terminal condition (7).
Step 3. Solve the conditional maximization problems in the third, second and ￿rst period
of adult life.
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where FjC is the ￿xed cost of child schooling level jC and Va+1(jC
a +1;:) and Va+1(jC
a ;:) de￿ne,
respectively, the expected value over the maximum between the conditional value functions of
the schooling and work alternative in the next period given the decision of sending the child,
respectively, to school or to work in the current period.






























a ;Aa+1;p(a + 1);￿;za+1)]
In the second period the child is sent to compulsory basic education. The maximization








s:t: ca = Aa(1 + r) + wjP;a ￿ F1 ￿ Aa+1
where F1 denotes the ￿xed costs of basic education and Va+1(1;:) de￿nes the expected value
over the maximum between the conditional value functions of the schooling and work alternative














a = 1;Aa+1;p(a + 1);￿;za+1)]
where jC
a = 1 denotes completed basic education.
In the ￿rst period of adult life the child is in pre-school. Child education, jC
a , is normalized








s:t: ca = Aa(1 + r) + wjP;a ￿ Aa+1
Step 4. Compute the new initial guesses for W Sch
a (:) and W Work
a (:).
The solution of the model in steps two and three provides the complete set of value functions
and optimal saving rules for any combination of the state space variables. I can use the optimal
value function in the ￿rst period of adulthood, Va, as a new initial guess for the child lifetime
utility. Denoting with jC
a the level of education of the child at the end of the last period of
coresidence, Va(jP = (jC
a + 1);Aa;p(a)) provides the new initial guess for W Sch
a (:) and Va(jP =
jC
a ;Aa;p(a)) provides the new initial guess for W Work
a (:). Given the new initial guesses for
W Sch
a (:) and W Work
a (:), I repeat steps two and three.
Given the conditional value functions for the work and schooling alternative, the child is sent
to school when the expected value of investing in schooling is at least as high as the expected











a ;Aa;p(a);￿;za) 8 a = a_ed;:::a
where a_ed denotes parental age when child education becomes a choice variable.















where " is an arbitrarily small number and jj:jj denotes the distance between the conditional
value functions in the ￿rst period of adulthood in two consecutive iterations.
Step 6. Compute the equilibrium skill prices as marginal productivities of the human capital
factors using the equilibrium conditions (11) to (13).
Compute a new guess of the vector of the skill prices as a linear combination of the guess
used to solve the model and the equilibrium prices computed in this iteration.
Step 7. Repeat steps two to six with the new guess for the vector of the skill prices.
Stop when the di⁄erence between each element of the vector of the equilibrium skill prices
and the initial guess for this price is arbitrarily small.
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